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The Use of Mediation to Settle 
Prisoner Grievances in Federal Court 
Michelle Burns 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, the United States had a total of 1,598,780 prisoners under the 
jurisdiction of state or federal correctional facilities.1  California alone had 
149,569 prisoners under the jurisdiction of its thirty-three federal and state 
prisons.2  Nineteen of these prisons in California are located in the Eastern 
District of California of the Ninth Circuit.3  While these numbers alone are 
overwhelming, these statistics are not just numbers; they are actual people 
who are sentenced to confinement and subject to the conditions of 
overcrowded prisons.4  The Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision in Brown v. Plata 
forced California to reduce its prison population and highlighted the tension 
between the constitutional rights of prisoners within the prison system and 
conditions of confinement in California prisons.5  The relationship between 
the prisoners and the prisons within which they are confined directly relates 
to the constitutional violations alleged by prisoners in grievances against 
those institutions.  The litigation claims that prisoners file under 18 U.S.C. § 
1983 in federal courts claim a violation of constitutional rights that accounts 
for a large portion of the caseload in the Eastern District of California in the 
Ninth Circuit.6 
This article will explore how different courts have used alternative 
dispute resolution methods, specifically mediation and mediation-like 
 
 1. E. Ann Carson & William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2011, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS  
(Dec. 17, 2012), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4559. 
 2. Id.; see also Eastern District of California Swamped by Prisoner Lawsuits, THE THIRD 
BRANCH NEWS (July 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/TheThirdBranch/10-07-
01/Eastern_District_of_California_Swamped_by_Prisoner_Lawsuits.aspx 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Tell California to Cut Prisoner Population, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 23, 2011 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/us/24scotus.html?_r=0&ref=prisonsandprisoners& 
pagewanted=print.  
 5. See generally Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).  
 6. THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS, supra note 2. 
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programs, to settle prisoner litigation claims that have overwhelmed the 
caseloads of federal district courts over the past few decades.7  In the Ninth 
Circuit, generally, and the Eastern District of California, specifically, the 
number of pro se prisoner complaints filed per year has increased the burden 
of an already budget-tight judicial system.8  Limitations in the amount of 
available judgeships and the location of California prisons have created a 
problem unique to the Eastern District of California.  While other federal 
districts have developed programs to accommodate heavy caseloads through 
ADR programs, the Eastern District is now creating and implementing a 
variety of programs to deal with the influx. 
Section II (a) of this article will review the statutes under which 
prisoners may file Section 1983 claims in the Federal District Courts.  
Section II (b) will address the overburdened Eastern District of California’s 
struggles to handle the large amounts of prisoner grievance cases that fall 
under its jurisdiction.  Section III of this article will highlight the programs 
now in place in the Eastern District of California as well as the District of 
Nevada and the District of Idaho as a point of comparison.  Section IV of 
this article will explore the implications of these programs with the 
traditional mediation model and some of the difficulties in implementing 
these programs.  Finally, Section V will conclude that ADR programs in 
prisoner litigation cases can work to alleviate caseloads and also have the 
potential to address the civil rights of prisoners and remedy the troublesome 
nature of prisons. 
II. SECTION 1983 CLAIMS AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
A. Background on Prisoner Grievances 
Prisoners of the federal prison system file grievances under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983,9 which creates a private cause of action for the deprivation of 
constitutional rights.10  Section 1983 provides a mechanism for all private 
actors to bring actions alleging a violation of their constitutional rights.11  
The text of the section reads: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 10. See Henry F. Fradella, In Search of Meritorious Claims: A Study of the Processing of 
Prisoner Civil Rights Cases in a Federal District Court, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 23, 25 (1999).  
 11. Id. at 25. 
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citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
depravation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress . . . .12 
While the statute does not specifically extend this mechanism to 
prisoners, prisoners do retain many constitutional rights after their 
confinement.13  Furthermore, case law has provided that a prisoner’s right to 
access the courts extends to civil rights claims.14  Therefore, prisoners may 
use this section to “challenge the conditions of their confinement.”15  For 
prisoners, the ability to file complaints alleging violations of their 
constitutional rights may be increasingly important as the nature of their 
confinement limits their ability to take action against violations of their 
constitutional rights.16  Prisoners usually file grievances for violations of 
their constitutional rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.17  First Amendment claims include violations of the exercise 
of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of association, access to libraries, 
and access to non-legal mail.18  Eighth Amendment violations include 
excessive force, failure to protect, medical treatment, conditions of 
confinement, retaliation, and general allegations of cruel and unusual 
punishment.19  Lastly, Fourteenth Amendment claims involve violations of 
due process and retaliation claims.20 
Due in large part to the perception that many claims filed by prisoners 
under section 1983 are frivolous and place a burden on district courts, 
 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 13. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). 
 14. JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS, 167-68 (Elisabeth Roszmann 
Ebben & Michael C. Braswell eds., 9th ed. 2010). 
 15. Fradella, supra note 10, at 25. 
 16. See PALMER, supra note 14, at 169. 
 17. Fradella, supra note 10, at 33.  
 18. Id. at 33.  Freedom of religion claims often arise when an item or act that the prisoner 
claims is included in his practice of religion is on a restricted list inside the prison.   
 19. Id.  Claims of retaliation usually include a prisoner claiming that the correctional officers 
or prison officials acted out against the prisoner because the prisoner filed a grievance in the prison.  
Section 1983 Prisoner Litigation Fundamentals Seminar UC DAVIS SCHOOL OF LAW (Dec. 2, 2011), 
http://mediasite.ucdavis.edu/Mediasite/ 
SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid=b5e1be3dc4f844dd94ca4a51d781bc0c1d (on file with author) 
 20. Early Inmate Mediation Program, U.S. DIST. COURT OF NEV., 18 (2010), available at 
http://www.nvd.uscourts.gov/Files/DC_Report2010.pdf; Fradella, supra note 10, at 33. 
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Congress passed the Prison Litigation Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) in 1996.21  The 
purpose in passing this legislation was to discourage prisoners from filing 
frivolous claims and thereby flooding the federal courts with prisoner 
grievances.22  It was “estimated that more than seventy percent of prisoner 
filings under section 1983 were frivolous.”23 
PLRA included the following provisions in order to limit the number of 
prisoner grievance filings:24 (1) the prisoner is required to pay at least a 
partial amount of the filing fee, and if the prisoner cannot afford it, the 
prison will deduct the money from the prison account regularly;25 (2) if a 
claimant has had three previous complaints dismissed for being frivolous, 
malicious, or failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the 
prisoner will not be allowed to file another complaint;26 (3) no monetary 
damages may be awarded unless there was physical harm;27 (4) the federal 
district courts must screen the complaints to assure that they are not 
frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 
or seek damages from a defendant with immunity;28 (5) the court has the 
 
 21. See PALMER, supra note 14, at 413; see also Derek Borchardt, The Iron Curtain Redrawn 
Between Prisoners and the Constitution, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 469, 470-71 (2012). 
 22. See PALMER, supra note 14, at 415.  Furthermore, PLRA reduced judges’ ability to order 
certain types of remedies, such as making broad policy changes or orders for release.  Christopher E. 
Smith & Christopher E. Nelson, Perceptions of the Consequences of the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act: A Comparison of State Attorneys General and Federal District Judges, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 295, 
295 (2002).  Incidentally PLRA, while an attempt to lessen caseloads, may have created a more 
time-consuming process for handling prisoner litigation in the federal courts.  Id. 
 23. See PALMER, supra note 14, at 413.  Those same estimates indicate that in the Ninth 
Circuit, ninety-nine percent of prisoner civil rights filings were frivolous.  Id. 
 24. See id., supra note 14, at 416–17, for a summary on the provisions of PLRA.   
 25. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (2012).  In instances where the prisoner is allowed to proceed in 
forma pauperis, the court may still require the prisoner to pay a partial filing fee.  PALMER, supra 
note 14, at 418.  This may be done over time by withdrawals from the prisoner’s account until the 
amount is paid in full.  Id. at 419.  In addition, the prisoner must still pay the filing fee if the 
complaint is dismissed.  Id.  
 26. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012).  This provision is meant not only to stop the flow of frivolous 
lawsuits into the federal courts, but also to act as a deterrent for prisoners to file a multitude of 
claims without real merit.  PALMER, supra note 14, at 419.  Individually, a prisoner is required to 
determine which claims are worth pursuing so as not to lose the opportunity to file another 
complaint.  However, the statute does state that in the event that the prisoner is in “imminent danger 
of serious physical injury,” they should be allowed to file despite the “three strikes” rule.  Id.   
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2012).  The statute reads, “No Federal civil action may be brought 
by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury 
suffered while in custody, without a prior showing of physical injury.”  Id.  This provision places a 
limit on the relief the court may grant to the prisoners, making it less likely for prisoners to receive 
monetary rewards for these claims.   
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(b) (2012).  The court is required to 
screen all complaints and may dismiss any complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted, even in cases where the prisoner is not filing in forma pauperis.  PALMER, supra 
4
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power to revoke “goodtime” credits from a prisoner if the court finds the 
prisoner is filing to harass prison staff;29 (6) limits are placed on available 
attorneys fees;30 and (7) prisoners are required to exhaust all administrative 
remedies available at the institutions before filing in federal court.31 
However, the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement at the 
institutions is not regulated.32  Prisons create and administer these grievance 
procedures and compliance is not necessary to get into court.  While this is a 
possible way to solve conflicts before courts become involved, the lack of 
regulation may just be serving to make the process more difficult for 
prisoners to get violations against their civil rights at the hands of those 
violating their rights.33 
PLRA’s exhaustion and screening requirements have not necessarily 
eased the burden of prisoner grievance complaints on the courts.  As the 
majority of litigants are pro se, the screening requirement takes both time 
and man power in the courts to review complaints for cognizable claims. 
B. Caseloads in Ninth Circuit 
The District Courts of the Ninth Circuit are currently overburdened with 
case filings for limited judgeships.  This has created a significant problem in 
districts that have a large number of prisoner grievances filed under section 
 
note 14, at 419.  The standard of review for screening these complaints is abuse of discretion, giving 
wide latitude to the district courts to determine where a prisoner has stated a cognizable claim.  Id.  
 29. 28 U.S.C. § 1932 (2012).  In the event that the court determines that a prisoner’s complaint 
or series of complaints are being filed for the purpose of harassment of a prison official, the court 
may revoke any “good behavior” credits.  PALMER, supra note 14, at 419.  These credits sometimes 
provide prisoners with certain privileges and possibly an earlier release.  Id.  The court may take this 
action on its own upon a finding of harassment.  Id. 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2012).  While the attorneys’ fees provision does not relate to the 
purpose of this article specifically, the general idea that there are limits on what will be awarded to 
attorneys may serve to temper prisoner litigation filings. 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012).  The statute reads, “No action shall be brought with respect 
to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title or under any other Federal law, by a prisoner 
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are 
available are exhausted.”  Id.  The exhaustion of administrative remedies as a prerequisite to filing in 
federal court serves varying purposes. Not only is it an attempt to ensure that claims that reach the 
court system have some merit, it also gives institutions the opportunity to solve or correct problems 
before they are taken to court.  
 32. Borchardt, supra note 21, at 490.  
 33. See id. at 490. 
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1983.34  In particular, the Eastern District of California has the largest 
caseload of the United States Federal Courts.35  Prisoner litigation makes up 
about fifty-four percent of the civil caseload in the Eastern District.36  The 
geographic location that the Eastern District of California encompasses 
covers around seventy percent of the prisons in California.37  This number 
reflects “roughly 100,000 prisoners” filing their grievances in the Eastern 
District.38  In contrast, upon average, prisoner litigation usually takes up 
about ten percent of a district’s caseload.39 
This heavy caseload mixed with shortages in judgeships have increased 
the workload of the current judges in the Eastern District.40  Visiting judges 
from other districts and the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit 
volunteered to help with prisoner civil right mediation programs in order to 
deal with the flood of prisoner litigation in the district.41  Districts in the 
Ninth Circuit adopted ADR programs in prisoner litigation cases in order to 
reach a settlement before trial.42  These programs include the use of third-
party neutral mediators, federal district court judges, and, more commonly, 
federal court magistrate judges.43  Generally, magistrate judges can be 
assigned many of these types of cases in order to alleviate some of the strain 
on the district court judges.44  These settlements take place at varying times 
 
 34. THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS, supra note 2. 
 35. Eastern District Uses Innovative Practices But Still Needs More Judges, U.S. DIST. 
COURT, E. DIST. OF CAL., http://www.caed.uscourts.gov/caednew/index.cfm/news-updates/eastern-
district-of-california-needs-new-judgeships-to-stem-docket-overload2/. 
 36. THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS, supra note 2. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  “Prisoner lawsuits last year [2009] gave the district the highest weighted civil caseload 
per judgeship in the nation.”  Id.  The district still ranks at the top of the nation for total filings in a 
year and pending cases.  Id. 
 40. See United States District Court-Caseloads and Statistics, California Eastern, U. S. 
COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT (Nov. 4, 2012, 7:46 PM), 
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/statistics/ca_eastern.pdf.  In 2011, the Eastern District had a total of 
6,734 filings and civil filings were distributed at 933 per judgeship.  Id.  Overall, judges had 1,319 
cases pending per judgeship.  Id.  Note that these numbers contain all civil filings and are not limited 
to prisoner litigation cases, but such filings are included in the numbers for civil filings.  
 41. THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS, supra note 2. 
 42. Id.  An overview of some of the implemented programs will be discussed in detail below.  
As an initial measure to alleviate some of the stress of the caseload, judges from around the circuit 
volunteered to mediate prisoner civil right cases.  Id.  
 43. Eastern District Uses Innovative Practices But Still Needs More Judges, supra note 35.   
 44. THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS, supra note 2.  Despite the success of the efforts of the district 
thus far in settling prisoner litigation, new filings continue to outpace case terminations.  Eastern 
District Uses Innovative Practices But Still Needs More Judges, supra note 35.   
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in the litigation process, depending on the program the courts adopt.45  The 
nature of these complaints generally lends itself well to the mediation 
process, considering the on-going relationship between the parties and the 
court’s interest in judicial economy.  Additionally, the use of mediation to 
settle these complaints may also serve as a conduit for prisoner rehabilitation 
and social justice. 
III. PRISONER ADR PROGRAMS IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, 
THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA, AND THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
Courts have adopted various programs throughout the Ninth Circuit to 
handle the high level of prisoner civil rights litigation.46  The Eastern District 
of California’s program will be the main focus of this article.47 As points for 
contrast in the shape prisoner ADR programs may take, the District of 
Nevada’s and the District of Idaho’s programs will also be addressed.48 
A. Nevada49 
The program in the District of Nevada uses a two-track system, which 
includes a mediation track and a litigation track.50  This program uses both 
an early mediation model as well as a post-summary judgment settlement 
conference model similar to that used in the Eastern District of California.51  
Early mediation initially diverts all prisoner grievances to the mediation 
 
 45. THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS, supra note 2. 
 46. Interview with Denise M. Asper, Prison Litigation Project Director, Judicial Council of the 
Ninth Circuit Office of the Circuit Executive, in L.A., Cal. (Nov. 29, 2012). 
 47. See Denise M. Asper, Mediating Behind Bars: ADR Options in Prisoner Civil Rights 
Cases, PACE LAW LIBRARY, 
http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/committees/adr/publications/ADR_Options_in_Prisoner_Cases2.pdf 
(last visited November 4, 2012); Early Inmate Mediation Program, supra note 20; John F. Murtha & 
Brett Bitzer, A New Pro Bono Opportunity With The District Court of Nevada: Mediation of 
Prisoners’ § 1983 Civil Rights Actions, NEV. LAW., July 2008, at 26. 
 48. It should be noted that the program explored in the Eastern District is younger than the 
programs established in both the District of Nevada and the District of Idaho.  The circumstances 
surrounding the number of prisoner civil litigation cases filed in the Eastern District of California 
has influenced the method of implementation of the ADR in this district.  Furthermore, the programs 
in the District of Nevada and the District of Idaho are meant only to illustrate the different types of 
ADR methods that may be utilized to handle prisoner civil litigation claims.  
 49. See generally Murtha & Bitzer, supra note 47. 
 50. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46. 
 51. Id.   
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track.52  Private attorneys work as mediators and must be trained in 
mediation.53  Prisoners are not usually represented in these mediations.54  
The early mediation model uses the private attorneys acting as mediators 
while the post summary judgment settlement conference model uses 
magistrate judges.55  The early mediation model requires backing and 
support from the Department of Corrections in order to get the parties to 
settle without the claims having survived summary judgment.56 
B. Idaho 
The District of Idaho uses ADR in prisoner litigation cases at three 
possible points in litigation—pre-answer mediation, mediation at the close 
of discovery, and judicially supervised settlement conferences prior to trial.57  
The judicially supervised settlement conference addresses cases at the point 
in litigation when the claim has survived summary judgment.58  The program 
uses both magistrate judges and private mediators in its settlement.59  The 
magistrate judges have been trained in ADR and may use mediation 
techniques in the settlement conferences.60 
In screening the cases for mediation or settlement, the district looks at 
the type of claim.61  The program looks for trends in the claims from 
prisoners so that some claims can be grouped together by type or even by 
institution in order to address any institution wide claims.62  Once these are 
identified, the cases are consolidated and appointed attorneys from the pro 
bono program in the district.63  These appointments are limited-scope 
appointments in which one attorney is appointed for the entire group, 
mimicking a class action civil procedure structure.64  The appointment 
removes the mediator or magistrate judge from being in the position of 
 
 52. Murtha & Bitzer, supra note 47, at 28.   
 53. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Asper, supra note 47. 
 58. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46. 
 59. Id.  When a magistrate judge is acting as a facilitator for agreement, the program is called 
a “judicially supervised settlement conference.”  Id.  In the alternative, when a private mediator is 
acting in the program, the process is termed “mediation.”  Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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having to give legal advice to the prisoner as they are often uninformed 
about the law and the types of remedies that are allowed and feasible.65 
This type of screening has had some success in creating institution wide 
remedies.66  By addressing a certain issue that many prisoners had, the court 
was able to clear the docket of a large number of groups rather than 
individually going to trial and possibly requiring the defendants to pay 
monetary damages to each individual prisoner.67  However, in these types of 
consolidated cases, it is essential for all the stakeholders, including the 
prisoners, the Attorney General, and the prison to “buy in.”,68  Additionally, 
the smaller size of the district allows for this type of large scale screening 
process. 
C. Eastern District of California 
The large geographical region that the Eastern District of California 
encompasses includes a large number of prisons.69  Cases are assigned to 
different district court judges, who often assign them to magistrate judges.70  
Both district judges and magistrate judges have staff attorneys in their 
chambers who have subject matter expertise in the area of prisoner 
litigation.71  Complaints are screened under the requirements provided in 
PLRA.72  Once the court finds that a prisoner has stated a claim upon which 
relief may be granted, the complaints are screened for mediation on an 
individual basis.73  Staff attorneys look for complications in the case or lack 
of a need for large policy changes as a remedy.74  This program does not use 
the consolidation approach in screening complaints but looks for individual 
claims to settle.75  Through this process, the cases are screened on an 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS, supra note 2. 
 70. Telephone Interview with Sujean Park, ADR and Pro Bono Program Director, U.S. 
District Court – Eastern District of California (Dec. 10, 2012).   
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. Telephone Interview with Honorable Craig Kellison, Federal Magistrate Judge, U.S. 
District Court – Eastern District of California (Dec. 13, 2012). 
9
Burns: The Use of Mediation to Settle Prisoner Grievances in Federal Cou
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2014
 162 
individual basis as to whether or not the case would be a good candidate for 
mediation.76  Sometimes the court will send an order setting the case to 
mediation and requiring the State (the Attorney General, representing the 
particular prison or institution and parties named thereunder) to explain why 
the case should not go to mediation or to a settlement conference.77 
In the Eastern District of California, settlement conferences or 
mediations usually occur after dispositive motions, meaning the case must 
survive summary judgment before it goes to mediation.78  Waiting until after 
the claim has survived summary judgment creates a greater incentive for the 
State to want to settle.79 
In the Eastern District of California, magistrate judges perform 
settlement conferences either inside the prisons, by video, or by court-call 
depending on what is feasible.80  The ADR program in place in the Eastern 
District works closely with the pro bono panel of the district in order to get 
some appointments of counsel for the prisoners, but usually prisoners are not 
represented in mediations or settlement conferences.81 
The ADR program in the Eastern District also utilizes McGeorge Law 
School at the University of the Pacific and its Prisoner Civil Rights 
Mediation Clinic.82  The clinic works with Magistrate Judge Craig Kellison 
as co-mediators in the settlement of prisoner civil rights litigation.83  The 
students interview the prisoner before the mediation is set to take place.84  
Students provide prisoners with information about the mediation or 
settlement conference process and allow the prisoner an opportunity to tell 
his or her story.85  Students then provide Judge Kellison with a confidential 
memo with information about the prisoner in order to facilitate the process 
 
 76. Id.  In my conversation with Judge Kellison, he asserted that, in his experience, the State 
hardly ever settles before it survives summary judgment.  Telephone Interview with Honorable Craig 
Kellison, supra note 75.  This is presumably because the state does not really deem the suit a risk or 
a threat before this point.   
 77. Id.; Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46. 
 78. Telephone Interview with Sujean Park, supra note 70. 
 79. Telephone Interview with Honorable Craig Kellison, supra note 75.   
 80. THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS, supra note 2. 
 81. Telephone Interview with Sujean Park, supra note 70.  In a similar format to that of the 
District of Idaho, magistrate judges perform settlement conferences rather than mediations.  This 
distinction is important as it may suggest differences in the way a case is settled.   
 82. Id.  When working with the students in the clinic, the process is called a “co-mediation” 
rather than a supervised settlement conference.  Id. 
 83. Here, certain aspects of mediation, which are lost in settlement conferences by magistrate 
judges, are restored by the involvement of the students.  This program tends to look more like a 
mediation than the settlement conferences involving only a magistrate judge do.    
 84. Telephone Interview with Honorable Craig Kellison, supra note 75.   
 85. Id. 
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of settlement.86  After speaking with the students, the prisoners are more 
informed about the process of the settlement conference or mediation.87  
This way the judge does not have to explain to the prisoner certain aspects of 
the settlement agreement, like confidentiality, which can take some time.  
This system also works to better facilitate settlement.88  Judge Kellison 
explained that although he does not alter his methods in gaining settlement 
when he is practicing with the students or without, he has found that overall 
the process has run more smoothly when the students interview the prisoners 
before the settlement conference.89 
In the Eastern District of California in 2012, magistrate judges held 
thirty-four settlement conferences in prisoner civil rights cases and settled 
twenty-one of those cases.90  In 2012, no volunteer attorney mediators were 
used to settle cases.91  The McGeorge Clinic, along with Judge Kellison, 
settled nine of seventeen settlement conferences.92  In 2008, thirty cases 
went to settlement and fifty percent were settled; in 2009, forty-nine cases 
went to settlement and forty-five percent were settled; in 2010, seventy-one 
cases went to settlement and thirty-seven percent were settled; in 2011, 
forty-two cases went to settlement and thirty-one percent were settled; and in 
2012, fifty-eight cases went to settlement and forty-five percent were 
settled.93 
The use of ADR programs to settle prisoner civil rights cases has not yet 
been studied with an emphasis on providing data that would indicate the 
actual rates of success of these programs in providing a solution to the 
overwhelming caseloads, including prisoner civil rights claims.  Despite the 
lack of empirical data to support a movement toward ADR as a solution to 
prisoner civil rights claims, an exploration of settlement of these claims 
through mediation or mediation techniques in settlement conferences will 
illuminate the numerous positive effects these programs can have in this 
context.  The nature of these settlements has the ability to provide benefits 
for the prisons, the prisoners, and the courts.  The regular use of mediations 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. CAED Settlement Statistics, Prisoner Civil Rights Cases – provided by S. Park. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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to settle prisoner grievance claims may also influence the in-house grievance 
procedures such that the institutions adopt more effective tools that limit the 
number of cases that come to court.94 
IV. THE MEDIATION PROCESS IN THE PRISONER GRIEVANCE CONTEXT 
A. Mediation Process Considerations 
The use of mediation or settlement conferences to settle prisoner 
grievance claims as applied in the various ADR programs established in the 
Ninth Circuit brings forth some important implications in comparison to the 
traditional mediation model.  The nature of the types of claims to be settled 
between the parties as well as the different types of mediation-like methods 
the courts have applied in their ADR programs both contribute to the unique 
nuances in the mediation process.95  These differences have possible 
negative and positive effects as to whether mediation is the appropriate 
method for settlement of prisoner grievances and its overall success.  
Overall, however, mediation or mediation-like settlement conferences can 
accommodate certain aspects of prisoner litigation that the courts cannot.  
This is in addition to the potential for judicial economy through these ADR 
programs.96 
First, there are multiple levels of power issues at work in some of these 
types of mediations or settlement conferences.97  There is a distinct power 
imbalance between the parties in prisoner grievance litigation.  A party, the 
prisoner, is usually at a substantially disadvantaged bargaining position 
compared to the other party, the State,98 which can cause a serious issue in 
the mediation process.99  Power imbalances in mediations can undermine the 
process of mediation as a forum in which both parties come to a mutually 
 
 94. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46. 
 95. See Louise Otis & Eric H. Reiter, Mediation By Judges: A New Phenomenon in the 
Transformation of Justice, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 351, 374 (2006).  “The nature of the conflict, 
coupled with the ways in which the participants understand and characterize that conflict, largely 
determines the intensity of the conflict, the scope of its issues, and ultimately the options for its 
resolution.”  Id. 
 96. See Jordi Agustí-Panareda, Power Imbalances in Mediation: Questioning Some Common 
Assumptions, 59 DISP. RESOL. J. 24, 29 (2004). 
 97. See Benjamin F. Overton, From the Chair: Training is Essential for Judges as Mediators!, 
7 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 2 (2001). 
 98. The “State” includes the prisons or institution and their employees, who are the usual 
named defendants in prisoner grievances, as well as the Attorney General who represents them.   
 99. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46.  This is of particular concern when the 
party with the disadvantaged bargaining position is not represented by counsel or there is a limited 
purpose appointment.  Id.  
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agreeable solution to their conflict.100  Whether the program established by 
the district court includes a third-party neutral mediator or a magistrate judge 
to facilitate the settlement process, the way this power imbalance is handled 
directly influences the relative success of getting to an agreement or the type 
of agreement reached.101  What the individual mediator does to account for a 
power imbalance is not within the scope of this discussion.  Nonetheless, the 
presence of a third party, whether a mediator or a magistrate judge, 
influences the power dynamic between the parties.102  Third-party neutrals 
and magistrate judges alike may have influence over the parties as a result of 
legal expertise or experience in this area, which can aid in coming to a 
successful agreement despite the parties’ unequal bargaining positions.103 
The use of magistrate judges to perform settlement conferences in 
prisoner grievance cases brings forward another dynamic of power into the 
settlement conference.104  The way the magistrate judge performs the 
settlement conference and the techniques he utilizes influences the power 
balance of the mediation—but so does the perception of the judge by the 
parties.105  Judges are a part of the court system so the prisoners may 
perceive the judge as impartial, independent of the influence of the prison 
and a legitimate source of power within the negotiation of a settlement.106  
On the other hand, there is a possibility that judges are more likely to control 
 
 100. Power imbalance issues in mediation stem from the assumption that the party in the 
stronger position will bully the weaker party into settlements.  However, there are arguments that 
weaker parties are protected against this threat in the mediation setting because they may simply 
refuse to settle if they feel forced into an agreement.  See Agustí-Panareda, supra note 96, at 28-29. 
 101. Id. at 29. 
 102. Id. at 30. 
 103. See George F. Cole & Jonathan E. Silbert, Alternative Dispute-Resolution Mechanisms for 
Prisoner Grievances, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 306, 318 (1984). 
 104. The term settlement conference is used to identify when a magistrate judge is acting as the 
facilitator of conversation between the parties.  Telephone Interview with Sujean Park, supra note 
70.  To a large extent, the magistrate judges use mediation techniques to help facilitate settlement 
between the parties.  Telephone Interview with Honorable Craig Kellison, supra note 75.  In 
settlement conferences, both parties are free to not settle and proceed onto litigation.  However, 
when a magistrate judge is holding the settlement conference, he may be more likely to inform the 
parties of the negative consequences of not settling a particular case.  
 105. See Otis & Reiter, supra note 95, at 362; Omer Shapira, Exploring the Concept of Power 
in Mediation: Mediators’ Sources of Power and Influence Tactics, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
535, 549-50 (2009).  
 106. See Otis & Reiter, supra note 95, at 365. 
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the process and the solution more so than other civil mediations.107  As a part 
of the court system, the magistrate judge may influence the parties to come 
to settlement; this is particularly true of the prisoner.108  In the context of 
prisoner litigation, this may aid in a successful mediation or settlement 
process.  The inherent tension between the parties could inhibit their ability 
to communicate well enough to come to some sort of an agreement––with a 
magistrate judge working as a facilitator for agreement, both parties are 
forced to communicate with the other and are pushed toward reaching a 
settlement rather than continuing into litigation, if possible.109  The extent to 
which this is done may help or hinder the settlement depending on the 
particular relationship between the prison and the prisoner.110  However, the 
nature of the relationship between the parties and the law in prisoner 
grievance settlements can benefit from mediation in the shadow of the 
law.111 
Other factors also may contribute to a power imbalance, especially if the 
prisoner is not aware of the legal issues and does not have representation.  
When the parties are not aware of their legal rights or the process in general, 
the magistrate judge or the mediator may be in a position where they have to 
decide between informing the prisoners of their legal rights and allowing the 
defendants to take advantage of the prisoners’ unawareness of these rights.112  
This puts the mediator in a difficult position, especially when the prisoner 
begins to ask for legal advice, because the mediator needs to be neutral.113  
In the alternative, if prisoners are not represented, they may enter the 
mediation or settlement conference with unrealistic expectations about the 
 
 107. Cf. id., at 367 (explaining that the use of judicial mediation intensifies the mediator’s 
difficulty in allowing the parties to control the process).  
 108. Shapira, supra note 105, at 549-50.  
 109. See KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 342 (3d ed. 2004) 
(explaining that mediations and settlements in the court context push parties to settle).  
 110. Additionally, this power imbalance is not necessarily something that can be remedied in 
prisoner grievance litigation in either mediation or in the court system.  See Agustí-Panareda, supra 
note 96, at 29.  
 111. See Otis & Reiter, supra note 95, at 378.  
 112. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46.  The use of magistrate judges instead of 
mediators moves the process away from what is usually called mediation.  However, in some cases, 
the use of a judge in ADR to settle prisoner civil rights complaints may be more useful as the 
prisoner may view and respect the authority of a judge more so than they would a private mediator.  
Honorable Candy Wagahoff Dale, Judicially Supervised Alternative Dispute Resolution: 
Perspectives From A Magistrate Judge, 56 FED. LAW. 47, 58 (2009).  
 113. Webcasts, UC Davis School of Law, Section 1983 Prisoner Litigation Fundamentals 
Seminar (Dec. 2, 2011), http://mediasite.ucdavis.edu/Mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid= 
b5e1be3dc4f844dd94ca4a51d781bc0c1d.  
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type or amount of remedies they should receive.114  For example, if a 
prisoner requests to be released as the remedy for a claim with respect to 
prisoner conditions, they must be aware that this type of remedy is only 
available in very limited circumstances and not available in settlements.115  
As a result, the prison may feel like it would be a waste of time to continue 
the settlement.  This also happens in contexts where the prisoners request 
large monetary sums.116  This slows down the settlement process and could 
cause the prison to be less willing to settle or communicate with the 
prisoner.  However, mediators may be able to “talk the prisoner down” from 
the first high offers in settlements, maybe even more so than in other non-
prisoner litigation cases.117  If the mediator or judge is viewed by the 
prisoner as trustworthy and having expertise in the area of the conflict, the 
prisoner is likely to allow the facilitator to guide the negotiation offers to a 
more realistic level. 
Similarly, if the prison is unwilling to offer any sort of acceptable relief 
for the prisoner, this might shut down communication efforts in the 
settlement conferences.  There is often a problem with sufficient “buy-in” 
from the defendants—in most cases the prison or the State as represented by 
the Attorney General.118  To be successful, “[m]ediation requires agreement 
by all parties that the issues are open for discussion and possible 
resolution.”119  If the prisons and their representatives are not open to 
negotiating a settlement with prisoners, the entire process is useless.120  
Some possible reasons for the prisons to avoid settling with prisoners may 
include the public’s negative perception of such settlements and the need of 
the prison and correctional officers to “save face” in front of prisoners.  
There is little incentive for the State to agree to mediation or settlement over 
 
 114. Telephone Interview with Honorable Jennifer L. Thurston, U.S. Magistrate Judge, U.S. 
District Court – Eastern District of California (Dec.10, 2012). 
 115. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3) (2012).   
 116. Webcasts, UC Davis School of Law, Section 1983 Prisoner Litigation Fundamentals 
Seminar (Dec. 2, 2011), http://mediasite.ucdavis.edu/Mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid= 
b5e1be3dc4f844dd94ca4a51d781bc0c1d. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46. 
 119. George F. Cole, et. al, Mediation: is it an effective alternative to adjudication in resolving 
prisoner complaints?, 65 JUDICATURE 481, 486 (May 1982). 
 120. Webcasts, UC Davis School of Law, Section 1983 Prisoner Litigation Fundamentals 
Seminar (Dec. 2, 2011), http://mediasite.ucdavis.edu/Mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid= 
b5e1be3dc4f844dd94ca4a51d781bc0c1d (noting the difficulty of getting some of the defendants to 
even present any type of benefits in settlement). 
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goingto trial if the State does not believe the claim has merit or if the cost of 
going to litigation does not directly implicate the prisons themselves.121  In 
this respect, it is essential that the participating defendants are ready and 
willing to come up with solutions that are agreeable to the prisoner-
plaintiffs. 
The use of the mediation process over litigation may also address some 
important needs of prisoners.122  An important aspect of the mediation 
process that may be beneficial in prisoner civil rights cases is the need for 
the prisoner to be heard.123  As prisoners, the plaintiffs in these cases live in 
a highly dehumanizing environment.124  Their need for control or validation 
may perpetuate their desire to file these grievances in the first place.125  
When the prisoners get the opportunity to be heard, as is allowed in 
mediation settlements and to some extent settlement conferences held by 
magistrate judges, this satisfies that need.126  When a third-party neutral 
mediator is the facilitator of settlement, the mediator may have more time 
and experience in allowing the prisoner a chance to be heard.  Judge 
Kellison noted that in his settlement conferences, the help of the law 
students of the McGeorge clinic often made the mediations run more 
smoothly, at least in respect to allowing the prisoner to be heard before 
moving to a negotiation with the prison.127  Judge Thurston explained that 
even without the presence of a mediator or law student to listen to the 
prisoner’s story, the prisoner often felt validated in being heard by a federal 
judge, whether or not it was in a settlement conference rather than a 
courtroom.128  The mediation process lends itself to resolving the underlying 
issues in a conflict rather than just the dispute in the claim filed with the 
court.129 
Lastly, the relationship between the parties is on going, as after the 
settlement of this conflict whether through mediation or litigation, the 
 
 121. Webcasts, UC Davis School of Law, Section 1983 Prisoner Litigation Fundamentals 
Seminar (Dec. 2, 2011), http://mediasite.ucdavis.edu/Mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid= 
b5e1be3dc4f844dd94ca4a51d781bc0c1d. 
 122. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Telephone Interview with Honorable Craig Kellison, supra note 75.   
 128. Telephone Interview with Honorable Jennifer L. Thurston, supra note 114. 
 129. See Otis & Reiter, supra note 95, at 372.  “One of the strengths of mediation, as opposed 
to adjudication, is that it is possible to explore a problem more holistically in an effort to resolve the 
entire conflict and not simply its particular instantiation (the symptom, as it were) at a given point in 
time.”  Id.  
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prisoner will still be under the control of the prison and those who work 
there.  The continued interaction between the parties illustrates an important 
reason that mediation is beneficial in these types of conflicts.  The way the 
settlement of these cases take place influences how the relationship goes 
forward, affecting both the life of the prisoner and the success of the prison 
and its employees in maintaining control and creating a safe environment––
both for themselves and for the prisoners.  Mediation allows for a mutual 
agreement while addressing a broader conflict. 
B. Issues with Implementation and General Concerns 
There are some major concerns with the implementation of these types 
of programs as well as specific aspects of some of the programs.  The point 
at which the mediation or settlement conference occurs and the screening of 
which cases go to mediation are two important factors in the success of 
mediations as a potential aid to judicial economy, especially in the Eastern 
District of California.  For example, the earlier in the process a mediation or 
settlement occurs, the faster these cases are removed from the docket and the 
less time court has to put in working on each individual case.  Waiting until 
the case survives summary judgment does involve distinct advantages in 
terms of buy-in from the State in order to settle.  After summary judgment 
the State may see the case as having some real merit and then might prefer to 
settle or be more inclined to participate in settlement than before the cases 
goes through dispositive motions.  If the program can somehow get the State 
to “buy-in” with the process in order to allow for mediation or settlement 
conferences earlier in the process, the program is more likely to ease the 
district courts’ case loads and lighten the burden on the judges handling 
these cases. 
Possible ways to incentivize an early mediation process starts from the 
courts themselves requiring such efforts.130  This may be that the courts use a 
specific and uniform screening process in order to flag certain types of cases 
which will customarily be successful in mediation.  In the Eastern District, it 
 
 130. But see Webcasts, UC Davis School of Law, Section 1983 Prisoner Litigation 
Fundamentals Seminar (Dec. 2, 2011), 
http://mediasite.ucdavis.edu/Mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid= 
b5e1be3dc4f844dd94ca4a51d781bc0c1d (highlighting that there is a need for the courts to 
encourage such a process, but that there is a fine line between coercion and encouragement––the 
more coerced parties feel to enter into mediation, the less likely that the parties will reach a 
successful settlement).  
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might not be feasible or efficient at this point to make the screening 
requirement include looking for trends in order to settle large groups of 
cases at once, but it may instead be helpful to look for trends in order to help 
identify which cases should be immediately––and early on––diverted to 
mediation or settlement.  In order for a program to be successful, it must 
have a screening component by which complaints that are frivolous or not 
appropriate for mediation for some other reason are identified.131  
Additionally, with time and set screening criteria, the State may become 
comfortable with the process of settlement and therefore, be more likely to 
take an active role in settling these claims early. 
Other than the State’s “buy-in” issues in the Eastern District, there are 
also “buy-in” issues with the courts as a whole.  In order for ADR programs 
in prison litigation claims to effectuate change, the programs need to become 
more uniform and involve more district court judges and federal judges than 
it currently does.  If all of the judges and staff attorneys assigned to these 
cases are working under the same set of screening requirements and 
processes for getting these cases to mediation, the efficiency of such 
programs will greatly improve. 
The need for ADR settlement programs in the Eastern District in dealing 
with prisoner litigation cases stems from a large number of these cases filed 
in the district with a lack of resources in order to resolve them within the 
traditional court system.132  In order to allow these programs to become 
effective in alleviating the stress on the district and ensuring, the district 
needs funds to support the implementation and study of these programs.  
Without widespread support for the program and implementation of district 
standards for the program, the efforts of the Eastern District may prove to be 
as frustrating as bailing out a flooding boat with a teaspoon. 
Additionally, support for these types of programs involves public 
perception of prisoners and how they understand the process.  These 
settlements may be perceived by the public as the State giving money to 
criminals for their frivolous claims about prison life.133  On the one hand, 
this can promote settlement because prisoners may not want to take a chance 
at convincing a jury that they have been wronged because the jury will not 
be very sympathetic to past crimes.134  This issue as to a certain stigma 
attached to settling with convicted criminals may include using alternative 
 
 131. See Cole & Silbert, supra note 103, at 324. 
 132. THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS, supra note 2. 
 133. See Borchardt, supra note 21, at 479-84. 
 134. Webcasts, UC Davis School of Law, Section 1983 Prisoner Litigation Fundamentals 
Seminar (Dec. 2, 2011), http://mediasite.ucdavis.edu/Mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid= 
b5e1be3dc4f844dd94ca4a51d781bc0c1d.  
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forms of remedies within the settlement rather than focusing on monetary 
damages.  These remedies may include: waiver of filing fees, apologies, 
policy changes, injunctive relief, items from the canteen, access to 
specialists, specialized diet, transfer of cell, and religious worship 
concessions.135  By using alternative means for settlement, the mediation 
process can become more successful at actually reaching settlement as well 
as serve as an example for future prisoner grievances for relief. 
V. BENEFITS OF MEDIATION TO JUDICIAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
While the ADR prisoner litigation program in the Eastern District of 
California has great potential to improve judicial economy, its benefits to 
social justice have not yet been fully discovered by the courts.  Along with 
aiding in physically taking cases off the docket, implementing such 
programs has the power to influence the way disputes are handled inside the 
prisons themselves, thereby reducing prisoner grievance filings in the federal 
courts overall. 
While prisoners’ needs are often overlooked, the state of prisons is not 
only harmful to prisoners but also to the safety of the prison staff.  
Furthermore, the costs of the prison systems and the issues with 
overcrowding place a strain on the already weak fiscal position of the nation.  
In addition, issues with rehabilitation and release may also be influenced by 
the widespread use of mediation programs in prisons.136  Finally, if the court 
can model a dispute resolution process that the institutions can use to settle 
these types of disputes themselves as part of the grievance process, these 
complaints do not have to go to court.137 
Through ADR programs in the Ninth Circuit, there has been some 
surprisingly positive feedback on the part of correctional officers at certain 
institutions as it relates to the safety of the prisons.138  Some correctional 
officers concluded that once judges entered the prison to hold a settlement 
agreement, the prison became a safer place.139  This may be in part to the 
 
 135. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note  46; Telephone Interview with Sujean Park, 
supra note 70;  Webcasts, UC Davis School of Law, Section 1983 Prisoner Litigation Fundamentals 
Seminar (Dec. 2, 2011), http://mediasite.ucdavis.edu/Mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid= 
b5e1be3dc4f844dd94ca4a51d781bc0c1d. 
 136. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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prisoners feeling like they had some actual form of redress, as an alternative 
to the court system, symbolized by the judges actually entering the 
premises.140  In addition, the legitimate opportunity to be heard may act as a 
deterrent to other means of perceived justice on the part of prisoners. 
The prospect of using federal court ADR programs in prisoner civil 
rights cases as an example for in-house prisoner grievance systems could 
serve to greatly lessen the need for prisoners to file these grievances in the 
first place.  Currently, there are some downfalls with the institutional prison 
in-house administrative remedies.141  While PLRA requires that prisoners 
exhaust all of these possible remedies before filing in court,142 the grievance 
systems are somewhat lacking.143  Prisoners have found it necessary to keep 
track of the paperwork they receive through the in-house administration 
process in order to be able to prove that they have exhausted these remedies. 
144 
The employees of the prisons whose job it is to determine whether the 
prisoners’ claims have merit and provide the proper avenues for redress 
often lose or take no action with the grievances filed by the prisoners.145  If, 
through training and by example in the mediation process of the federal 
ADR programs, the institutions can utilize mediation skills in handling these 
grievances, they will be able to handle the problems of the prison within the 
prison.146  This way, the court will not have to interfere on sensitive issues 
regarding the day-to-day happenings in the prison while providing prisoners 
with a productive system to settle their disputes.147 
Taking the possibilities a step further, if the mediation model and skills 
can be implemented as part of the administrative exhaustion of remedies, it 
may also be implemented as a life-training tool for the prisoners.148  These 
skills may provide the prisoners with alternative means to resolve disputes 
both in prison and when they are released.149 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Borchardt, supra note 21, at 490. 
 142. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012). 
 143. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The overburdened Eastern District of California has struggled to find a 
solution to the magnitude of prisoner litigation overwhelming its dockets.  
The large geographical area and large number of prisons within the district 
has created a unique problem that is getting little aid by way of the 
government.  The ADR programs already in place in the Eastern District of 
California have great potential as a tool for protection of prisoner civil 
rights, judicial economy, and as a long-term strategy to move the grievance 
process back into the prisons. 
If the program in the Eastern District of California can establish a more 
clear and uniform procedure for screening which complaints are ripe for 
mediation and when such complaints will go to mediation or settlement 
conferences, more cases will be able to settle out of further litigation within 
the courts.  If the program can be established as the main way these prisoner 
grievance cases are resolved, the potential to use mediation methods to 
resolve disputes within the prisons themselves may prove to be the best way 
to remove these cases from the court. 
The conditions of prisons and prisoners’ civil rights while incarcerated 
are not always at the forefront of public discourse.  However, the use of 
mediation to settle cases of constitutional rights violations is mutually 
agreeable to both prisoner and the State and it simultaneously addresses the 
continuing relationship between the two.  These programs have the potential 
to not just settle the conflict in front of the parties presently, but to influence 
future interactions between the parties.  The ability to influence long-term 
relationship dynamics may prove to solve issues with case overloads in the 
Eastern District of California, but it may also address some major issues 
within the prisons and institutions themselves. 
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